Climate and
Transportation
Solutions
Findings from the 2009 Asilomar Conference
on Transportation and Energy Policy
Daniel Sperling and
James S. Cannon ( Ed itors)
Climate and Transportation Solutions:
Findings from the 2009 Asilomar Conference on
Transportation and Energy Policy
Daniel Sperling
Editor
Institute of Transportation Studies
University of California, Davis
James S. Cannon
Editor
Energy Futures, Inc., Boulder, Colorado
Published by
Institute of Transportation Studies
University of California, Davis
One Shields Avenue, Davis, California 95616
© 2010 The Regents of the University of California, Davis campus
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons license:
http:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ by- nc- nd/ 3.0/
You are free to share, copy, distribute and transmit this work, under the following conditions: ( 1) You
must attribute the work in the manner specifi ed in this volume, but not in any way that suggests that we
endorse you or your use of the work. ( 2) You may not use this work for commercial purposes. ( 3) You
may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.
For more information contact its@ ucdavis. edu
iii
1 Combating Climate Changes from Transportation.................... 1
Daniel Sperling and James S. Cannon
2 Scenarios for Cutting Carbon Dioxide in Transport
70 Percent Worldwide by 2050.................................................... 9
Lew Fulton
3 U. S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Transportation
Sector............................................................................................. 24
John Conti, Nicholas Chase, and John Maples
4 Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Road Transport
in Latin America............................................................................ 33
Lee Schipper, Elizabeth Deakin, and Carolyn McAndrews
5 Role of Low Carbon Fuel Standard in Reducing
U. S. Transportion Emissions....................................................... 48
Sonia Yeh and Daniel Sperling
6 A Shared Goal: Addressing Climate Change and
Energy Security............................................................................. 62
Dave McCurdy and Kathryn Clay
7 Vehicle Standards in a Climate Policy Framework.................... 75
John M. DeCicco
8 Accelerating Technology Innovation in Transportation............ 89
John E. Johnston, Carmen Difi glio, Trevor Demayo,
Robert Marlay, and David Vincent
9 Smart Growth and Climate Change: California’s SB 375
and Sacramento’s Blueprint Experience.................................... 102
Mike McKeever
10 The Case for Diesel Cars To Reduce Greenhouse
Gas Emissions.............................................................................. 111
Johannes- Joerg Rueger
Table of Contents
iv
11 Overview of Light- Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy Technology
To 2025 and Policy Implications.................................................. 120
K. G. Duleep
12 Technologies and Policies for Improving Truck Fuel Effi ciency
& Reducing CO 2 ............................................................................ 133
Anthony Greszler
13 Improving the Energy Effi ciency and Environmental
Performance of Goods Movement.............................................. 145
James J. Winebrake and James J. Corbett
14 Potential Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Light- Duty Vehicles and Electricity Generation......................... 155
Andrew E. Lutz and Jay O. Keller
Appendix A: Biographies of Editors and Authors........................... 166
Appendix B: 2009 Asilomar Transportation Conference
Attendees............................................................................................ 171
v
Climate change has fully entered the public consciousness, but what to do and how fast
to do it remains intensely controversial. These and other questions about how to mold
transportation policy to help achieve climate goals was the focus of a high level meeting
in California in July 2009. Two hundred leaders and experts were assembled from the
automotive and energy industries, start- up technology companies, public interest groups,
academia, national energy laboratories in the United States, and governments from
around the world. Three broad strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions were
investigated: reducing vehicle travel, improving vehicle effi ciency, and reducing the carbon
content of fuels. This book is an outgrowth of that conference.
The conference was the latest in a series held roughly every two years on some aspect of
transportation and energy policy, always at the Asilomar Conference Center near Monterey
on the California coast. The fi rst conference in 1988 addressed alternative transportation
fuels; the last three have focused on climate change. The full list appears below:
I. Alternative Transportation Fuels in the ‘ 90s and Beyond ( July 1988)
II. Roads to Alternative Fuels ( July 1990)
III. Global Climate Change ( August 1991)
IV. Strategies for a Sustainable Transportation System ( August 1993)
V. Is Technology Enough? Sustainable Transportation- Energy Strategies
( July 1995)
VI. Policies for Fostering Sustainable Transportation Technologies ( August 1997)
VII. Transportation Energy and Environmental Policies into the 21st Century
( August 1999)
VIII. Managing Transitions in the Transport Sector: How Fast and How Far?
( September 2001)
IX. The Hydrogen Transition ( July 2003)
X. Toward a Policy Agenda for Climate Change ( August 2005)
XI. Transportation and Climate Policy ( August 2007)
XII. Transportation and Climate Policy ( July 2009)
The chapters of this book evolved from presentations and discussions at the 12th Biennial
Conference on Transportation and Energy Policy.
The Asilomar conference was hosted by the Institute of Transportation Studies at the
University of California, Davis ( ITS- Davis). The conference was supported by a diverse set
of government, foundation and industry sponsors. The premier Cypress Level sponsors
for 2009 included the Offi ce of Transportation and Air Quality of the U. S. Environmental
Preface and Acknowledgements
vi
Protection Agency, and the Center for Climate Change and Environmental Forecasting of
the U. S. Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration.
Otter Level Sponsors were the Offi ce of Research and Development of the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency, the U. S. Department of Energy, the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation, the Energy Foundation, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and
Bosch. Others providing important support included the Surdna Foundation, the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Offi cials ( AASHTO), Transport Canada,
the California Department of Transportation, the California Energy Commission, and the
UC Davis Sustainable Transportation Center.
In addition, companies provided support to conference host ITS- Davis for outreach
programs such as the Asilomar Transportation and Energy conference. These sponsors
include Aramco, ExxonMobil, Mitsui Power Systems, NetJets, Nissan, Pacifi c Gas and
Electric Company, Royal Dutch Shell, Subaru, and Toyota.
Most of all, we want to acknowledge the many attendees of the conference listed in
Appendix B. These invited leaders and experts, coming from many parts of the world
and many segments of society, enriched the conference with their deep insights and rich
experiences.
1
Chapter 1:
Combating Climate Changes from Transportation
by Daniel Sperling and James S. Cannon
Forty thousand political leaders, climate experts, and concerned citizens converged on Copenhagen in
December 2009 for a global climate summit. The summit was widely viewed as a failure, with the media
using expressions such as “ train wreck.” For those troubled by the risk of chaotic climate disruptions and
economic turmoil, this failure of leadership is painful.
Was Copenhagen really a train wreck, and is there really an utter failure of leadership? The disturbing
story popularized by the mass media is only part of the answer. Real progress is being made, even in the
international negotiations that faltered in Copenhagen. Just a few years ago, the president of the United
States ( U. S.) was denying the reality of climate change and refusing to take serious action to reduce
emissions. At the same time, China, the other principal emitter of carbon, was even more insistent that it
need not act. Yet in Copenhagen, a new U. S. president personally lobbied other government leaders and
promised to put the United States on a path toward dramatic reductions. He was joined by the premier of
China, who just one year before was saying that climate change was a scheme of rich countries to suppress
the developing countries of the world. In Copenhagen, he committed China to a modest international
partnership to tackle climate change.
While the 2.5- page Copenhagen agreement approved by 188 of 192 nations in attendance was undeniably
weak and vague, and didn’t even mention transportation, it, too, was an important step forward. The
world has rarely seen a larger group of heads- of- state in one place focused on one issue. Their presence
indicated that climate change is a top priority around the world. While they were unable to put in place a
new treaty to replace the Kyoto Accord of 1997, much good came of the meeting. Thousands of experts and
activists— from governments, industries, and non- governmental organizations— sat together and listened
to each other. It is not easy to get such a large and diverse group of nations to agree to major fi nancial and
institutional commitments for a problem that is still nearly invisible. In many ways, it is remarkable that so
many are so committed.
Whether the Copenhagen meeting was a train wreck or a modest step forward, greenhouse gas ( GHG)
emissions continue to increase and evidence of climate change becomes ever stronger. Global concentrations
of carbon dioxide ( CO 2 ) have reached the highest levels recorded since pre- industrial times.
____________________
D. Sperling is Director of the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Davis and
J. Cannon is President of Energy Futures, Inc.
2 Sperling and Cannon
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
In the United States, CO 2 emissions have grown at an average annual rate of 0.8 percent since 1990,
according to data from the U. S. Energy Information Administration ( EIA 2009). The total increase since
1990 has been 16.3 percent. The transportation sector is the second largest source of CO 2 emissions after
electricity generation, accounting for 33.1 percent of total U. S. emissions. Those emissions are principally
from the combustion of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel.
The Emerging Policy Paradigm
These grim statistics give way to some optimism when one turns to policy. As discussed in the pages of
this book, transportation- related climate policy is progressing rapidly. In recent years, the European Union
( EU), United States, Japan, and China all moved forward with aggressive policies to reduce fuel use and
carbon emissions from vehicles. Scattered around the world are strong national and regional policies to
decarbonize transport fuels. Only in restraining and reducing vehicle use has there been little progress, but
even here, some glimmers of light can be seen.
In fact, policy progress, as modest as it is, far exceeds real- world progress in actually reducing emissions,
providing some hope for the future. Many governments are putting in place durable and strong policy
frameworks to reduce carbon emissions from the transport sector. California is especially notable. Despite,
or perhaps because of, its legacy of pioneering car- centric transportation, California has been creative
and aggressive at taming motor vehicles. It leads the way in the United States with aggressive vehicle
requirements, a far- reaching low carbon fuel standard that could transform the oil industry, and a law to
reduce urban sprawl and vehicle use. Most other countries have a much smaller transport- related carbon
footprint than California, but California is leading the way in formulating comprehensive durable policy
frameworks, and many states and countries are following its lead.
In the United States, the fi rst major effort to rein in greenhouse gas emissions from transportation was
California’s 2002 law to dramatically reduce emissions from vehicles by 2016. In a sign of the times, that
law was blocked every step of the way. The auto industry fi led a series of lawsuits to block implementation
in California and other states that adopted the California program. When those industry lawsuits were
rejected by the courts, the administration of then- president G. W. Bush refused to allow California and the
other states to proceed. California responded by suing the national government.
In 2007, the U. S. Congress, after 30 years of inaction on vehicle fuel use, bumped the corporate average
fuel economy ( CAFE) standards upward 40 percent to 35 miles per gallon ( mpg), to be achieved in 2020.
Then, at a press conference in May 2009, newly- elected President Barack Obama and the CEOs of the
three major U. S. car companies cheerfully embraced the California law as a national standard, in effect
agreeing to move the 2020 deadline up to 2016— essentially agreeing to a requirement they had vociferously
opposed for seven years.
Other changes were also taking place. As part of the same 2007 energy law when CAFE standards
were fi rst raised, the U. S. Congress also dramatically expanded the biofuels requirement, raising it to 36
billion gallons by 2022. California took it one important step further. In 2009, it adopted a low carbon fuel
standard, requiring a 10 percent reduction in the carbon content of transport fuels by 2020, measured as
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy. To achieve this new standard would require about 30
percent of gasoline and diesel fuel to be replaced by low- carbon alternative fuels. The European Union also
adopted rules requiring a decarbonization of transport fuels, and many U. S. states and Canadian provinces
are following California’s lead. As with vehicle standards, industry groups that felt disadvantaged— in this
case corn ethanol producers-- fi led a lawsuit in January 2010 trying to block the fuel standards.
In the United States and most other countries, policies to tame cars and fuels are mostly crafted as
performance standards. They call for improvements in the technology and fuel, but they usually don’t
address how much that vehicle and fuel is used. Thus, a law enacted in California in late 2008 is of special
importance. It calls for reductions in urban sprawl and vehicle use, couched as reductions in greenhouse
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
3 Sperling and Cannon
gas ( GHG) emissions associated with passenger travel. While that law, known as Senate Bill ( SB) 375,
has few carrots and sticks associated with it, it provides a framework for reducing vehicle use that can be
built upon in the future. For California and the United States, that is revolutionary. This California law was
transferred in similar form to the national climate bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2009.
While the bill had still not passed into law as this book goes to press, the inclusion of a provision to reduce
vehicle use and urban sprawl is notable.
This cluster of transport- related policies represents a coherent and potentially effective policy framework
for reducing oil use and GHG emissions. As experience and analyses accumulate, a better sense of which
policy instruments are most effective is developing, including what types of changes are possible and likely.
Underpinning this new framework is a set of commonly shared observations among transportation experts,
which include the following:
• Climate goals are well aligned with energy and urban livability goals. What is good for climate
change is almost always good for energy security and healthy, successful cities.
• Major change and major innovation are needed in the transport sector
• Better technology is key, but these technological changes must be complemented with policies and
strategies that alter vehicle purchase and use behavior and reduce sprawl
• Transportation transformations are more a question of vision, leadership, and will than cost
• Fuel and vehicle transformations will require unprecedented coordination internationally, but, in the
end, it is local and national will and commitment that will be key.
Change will not be easy or quick. Many barriers remain. The fundamental problem is that surface passenger
transport is arguably the least innovative sector of the economy. In fundamental ways, the transport system
has barely changed since the 1920s. Functional and design attributes of vehicles and roads have been
roughly the same for decades. While vehicles today are safer and more reliable, they have about the same
size, carrying capacity, weight, and fuel economy as they did 80 years ago. They still have four wheels, drive
the same speed, and operate on petroleum. Roads and transit services are also functionally unchanged.
While there are many more expressways, almost all vehicles still travel on almost all roads, and almost all
are free. Transit service is also largely unchanged. Mass transit vehicles are more comfortable than in
earlier times and are air conditioned, but the frequency and distribution of service remains sparse.
There is a tremendous need for innovation in the transportation sector. The need for new low- carbon fuels
and advanced and more effi cient propulsion systems is clear, but innovation must go much deeper. This
means creating new transportation networks and fi nancing systems sup ported by governmental institutions
to manage the huge fi nancial fl ows that will be involved. It means effective management of land use by
local governments. And it means new and better ways of providing mobility and accessibility to people.
Ideas matter, but in this case knowledge matters more. Injecting knowledge into the debate is not easy.
Public debates about climate change are frequently framed around ideological and political themes, such as
free market versus regulatory approaches, food versus fuel priorities, the needs of haves versus have- nots,
and local jobs versus the global marketplace. It is important to engage these big ideas, but ultimately each
of them should be fi rmly grounded in science and data. The challenge for the informed decision maker is
to sort through the political slogans to determine those strategies and policies that are most effective and
most effi cient and equitable. This requires bringing science and data to bear on slogans and concepts.
Ignoring these analyses, or leaving them to the imagination of politicians and their staffs, is a recipe for bad
policy and bad laws.
The Asilomar Conference Series
The fi rst Biennial Conference on Transportation, Energy and Policy convened in 1988. Oil cost $ 15 per
barrel then, General Motors still dominated the automotive market, no one had heard of reformulated
4 Sperling and Cannon
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
gasoline, electric vehicles had not yet reappeared, hybrid electric vehicles were more than a decade from
commercialization, plug- in hybrids were an academic pipe dream, and fuel cells could take us to the moon
but not the corner store.
On the other hand, some of the weapons wielded today to fi ght climate change were already in the energy
policy portfolio. Biofuel policy had launched ethanol fuels, though it was produced almost exclusively from
corn, and the CAFE standards were well established, though they remained stuck at 27.5 mpg for cars for
another two decades. Much more obviously needed to be done.
Each Biennial Conference on Transportation, Energy and Policy has been held at the Asilomar Center in a
secluded coastal California state park in Pacifi c Grove. During the fi rst two decades and nine conferences,
the themes jumped among a wide range of topics from broad sustainable transport themes to the hydrogen
economy. The topic switched in 2005 to climate change, where it has remained fi xed for three conferences
over six years. Climate change is now widely recognized as the most critical environmental problem facing
the planet. Transportation is a major cause of the problem, and it has a key role to play in its solution.
Transportation policy experts from around the world that travel to Asilomar remain fi xated on climate policy
because the challenge is so huge and so important.
Thus, this book, like the two previous books that grew out of discussions at Asilomar, Driving Climate
Change in 2006 and Reducing Climate Impacts in the Transportation Sector in 2008, focuses on innovative
strategies to reduce GHG emissions from transportation. It addresses the fundamental question: Is it
possible to defi ne a path to a future just 40 years away in which transport- related CO 2 emissions have been
reduced 60 to 80 percent?
As in the past, the organizer of the 12th Biennial Conference on Transportation, Energy and Policy in July
2009 was the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Davis ( ITS– Davis) on behalf
of three committees of the U. S. Transportation Research Board, a research arm of the National Academies
in Washington, DC. They are the Energy, Alternative Fuels, and Sustainable Transportation committees.
ITS– Davis once again lured the most sophisticated and knowledgeable experts and leaders on climate
policy and transportation to the conference. This invitation- only, three- day event hosted 200 experts and
leaders from fi ve continents. This occurred with the global economy in disarray, automakers going bankrupt,
and governments handing out IOUs for their steep debts.
Overview of the Book
Strategies for reducing GHG emissions from the transportation sector can be categorized into three clusters,
sometimes referred to as the three legs of the transportation stool: improving the effi ciency of the vehicles,
reducing the carbon content in the fuel, and reducing vehicle use. The thirteen chapters that follow discuss
the effects of energy use in transportation on global GHG emissions and suggest new policies to strengthen
one or more legs of the transportation policy stool.
Regional Analyses Setting the Stage
The next three chapters examine climate change and transportation issues in specifi c regions of the world,
and offer examples of innovative actions to reduce climate effects in these areas.
The fi rst chapter is by Lew Fulton, Senior Transport Energy Analyst at the International Energy Agency
( IEA) in Paris, France. He notes that transport accounts for about 19 percent of global energy use and 23
percent of energy- related CO 2 emissions. Given current trends, transport energy use and CO 2 emissions
are projected to increase nearly 50 percent by 2030 and more than 80 percent by 2050. Without new
climate policies, the IEA predicts CO 2 equivalent ( CO 2- eq ) emissions nearly doubling in its baseline scenario
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
5 Sperling and Cannon
forecast, with the mix of transportation fuels remaining fairly constant. The IEA high baseline scenario
foresees an even greater 140 percent growth by 2050.
Either of these IEA baseline scenarios would be catastrophic for the global climate. To avoid the worst
impacts from climate change, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC)
advises that global CO 2 emissions be cut at least in half by 2050. To achieve this, transport will have to
play a signifi cant role. The IEA projects that a 70 percent reduction in transport CO 2- eq emissions in 2050 is
possible compared to the IEA baseline projection, though it would be highly challenging.
Fulton asserts that it will require both widespread adoption of today’s best available technology and longer
term development and deployment of a range of new technologies. All transport modes will need to reduce
their emissions signifi cantly compared to the baseline trends, in every region of the world.
John Conti, Director of the Offi ce of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting at the U. S. Energy Information
Administration ( EIA), and his colleagues Nicholas Chase and John Maples note in their chapter that
transportation emits more GHGs in the U. S. than the commercial, residential, and industrial end- use
sectors. Transport- related GHG emissions more than tripled in the U. S. between 1950 and 2009, but they
forecast a leveling off in the future.
The EIA projects U. S. GHG emissions from transportation will remain relatively fl at between 2010 and 2030,
though this leveling off is a far cry from the 80 percent reductions that may be needed in industrialized
countries to counter climate changes. Total liquid fuel consumption in transportation is projected to grow
from 164 billion gallons in 2000 to 196 billion gallons by 2030, but nearly all of the increase is forecast to
come from biofuels, including ethanol and biodiesel, which generally have fewer net CO 2 emissions than
gasoline or diesel refi ned from petroleum.
The authors report on their EIA analysis of a cap- and- trade program to reduce emissions. They conclude
that such a program will produce relatively little reduction in GHG emissions from the transportation sector.
This implies that, while transportation is a key to CO 2 emission reductions, a price on CO 2 will have little
effect on transportation demand. They suggest four proposals that would be more effective: increasing
vehicle fuel economy standards, using low carbon fuel alternatives, reducing passenger vehicle use, and
switching from heavy truck freight to rail and marine freight.
Lee Schipper at the Center for Global Metropolitan Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and his
colleagues Elizabeth Deakin and Carolyn McAndrews mov the geographical focus to Latin America. Their
chapter presents some disquieting statistics on rapid increases in CO 2 emissions from transportation in the
developing world. In Mexico, for example, the number of passenger vehicles more than doubled in one
decade, from 8.3 million in 1996 to 21.5 million in 2006. This was an astounding 9.6 percent annual growth
rate, with dire implications for climate change.
In comparison with the world as a whole, the CO 2 emissions in Latin America are more heavily concentrated
in transportation, with 35 percent of its total emissions from transportation. These transport emissions are
concentrated in road transport, accounting for over 90 percent of the region’s transport emissions.
Latin American cities have pioneered one of the most important transportation innovations, Bus Rapid
Transit ( BRT), fi rst in Curitiba, Brazil, but now in other large cities. Mexico City made a signifi cant investment
in dedicated bus lanes and BRT. BRT was devised and championed to reduce traffi c congestion, but it has
the additional benefi t of reducing local air pollution, oil use, and GHG emissions.
New Transportation Policies
The next set of fi ve chapters address new policy approaches to reduce GHG emissions. The fi rst chapter,
by Sonia Yeh and Daniel Sperling at University of California Davis, is an in- depth examination of the
California low carbon fuel standard ( LCFS) adopted by the California Air Resources Board in April 2009
6 Sperling and Cannon
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
and implemented statewide in January 2010. The LCFS is a performance standard, measured by total
GHGs per unit of fuel energy, that aims to reduce the GHG intensities of transportation fuels. The goal is
to account for all GHGs emitted in the lifecycle of transportation fuels, from extraction, cultivation, land use
conversion, processing, distribution, and fuel use.
California’s LCFS applies only to on- road transport fuels, excluding air and maritime transportation, where
California has limited authority. The standard is imposed on all transport fuel providers, including refi ners,
blenders, producers, and importers. Each fuel supplier in California must meet a GHG- intensity standard
that becomes increasingly stringent over time, ramping up to the 10 percent reduction in 2020. The LCFS
allows for trading and banking of emission credits. An oil refi ner could, for instance, buy credits from biofuel
producers. Alternatively, it could buy credits from an electric utility that sells power for use in electric vehicles.
Those companies that are most innovative and best able to produce low- cost, low- carbon alternative fuels
would do best.
The LCFS policy is gaining momentum, with other states and Canadian provinces embracing the California
LCFS model as of early 2010. The European Union is also implementing a carbon intensity standard for
fuels that is similar to the California LCFS.
Automakers in the United States are committed to a low- carbon future, say Dave McCurdy and Kathryn
Clay from the Automotive Manufacturers Association ( AMA), the principal trade association for the U. S.
auto industry. In their chapter, they note that transportation energy policy in the United States has been
dominated by the CAFE standards for over 30 years. They describe the May 2009 landmark agreement
between the automakers and President Obama that established a new fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg
for the U. S. motor vehicle fl eet by 2016.
Policies directed at transportation sector emissions, such as the new national fuel economy program, are
important, the AMA believes. At the same time, sector- based approaches cannot substitute for a more
economically effi cient, economy- wide program. The overall program should encompass the national
economy as completely as possible, they argue, whether the approach is based on a cap- and- trade program
or on other measures, such as a carbon tax. The approach should include market measures to the greatest
extent possible. Using market mechanisms can provide the pull needed to incentivize the rapid deployment
of advanced technologies. This national climate change strategy should clearly delineate appropriate roles
for federal, state, and local governments. They note that current legislative efforts in the U. S. Congress
refl ect many, but not all, of these principles.
They further argue that sustainable mobility should be pursued along four pathways. The fi rst involves
development of new vehicle technologies. Second, new low- carbon fuels are needed to power these
vehicles. Third, improvements to the national transportation infrastructure, including advanced roadway
designs, are needed. Finally, consumers, who are ultimately responsible for the purchase and use of cars
and fuels, need appropriate price signals and better information about vehicle and fuel choices.
The following chapter addresses the role of innovation in transforming the transportation and energy
systems. Jack Johnston, recently retired from ExxonMobil Research & Engineering, and his co- authors at
the U. S. Department of Energy, Chevron Energy Technology Company, and the United Kingdom Carbon
Trust argue for a close coupling of science, technology, and policy. “ One size fi ts all” approaches are not
consistent with the diversity of demand and supply patterns already existing in developed economies and
emerging in developing economies, they say in their chapter. It will be necessary to focus resources on
the technologies and policies that achieve the largest emission reductions and to integrate these policies
with economy- wide policies to reduce GHG emissions. In particular, it is essential that there be a close
linkage between policies to electrify the transportation sector and policies to reduce GHG emissions from
the power sector.
They explore examples of how government can encourage innovation, modify transportation demand, and
change the character of mobility. Changes in existing policies and measures can also be crucial. Almost any
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
7 Sperling and Cannon
innovation that requires a signifi cant change in fuel infrastructure, vehicle systems, or consumer behavior
will need government support in the early stages because of the magnitude of the existing transportation
systems and the relatively slow turnover of technology and evolution of practices.
John DeCicco at the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment believes vehicle
performance standards related to GHG emissions are important because they directly target decision
making in the auto market, which is an important determinant of total emissions. U. S. policymakers have
decided that vehicle performance standards— based on either fuel economy or GHGs— are an essential
tool in the climate policy mix. Neither form of vehicle standard, however, now includes a mechanism for
formal coordination with economy- wide climate policy, says DeCicco. Reviewing the history of fuel economy
standards and emissions standards for conventional air pollutants suggests that a legal linkage to well-defi
ned environmental goals is important for ongoing progress toward those goals. Such an economy- wide
policy could be a cap- and- trade system or other national program that provides well- defi ned targets and
timetables for limiting GHG emissions.
DeCicco proposes to link the administration of vehicle standards to overarching GHG emissions goals
by requiring agencies overseeing all elements of the transportation sector, including motor vehicles, to
periodically assess the sector’s progress in limiting GHG emissions. Agencies would then be obligated to
update their policies as needed to ensure that the sector is effectively helping reduce GHG emissions in
a manner consistent with the targets and timetable of the national cap. Such an approach places vehicle
standards within the framework of an overall climate policy.
Mike McKeever of the Sacramento Area Council of Governments ( SACOG) notes that new land use
planning efforts are another critical component of future transportation policies to reduce climate impacts.
He describes in his chapter how SACOG, representing the governing bodies of 22 cities and six counties in
central California, has developed a regional land use plan that has become the model for a statewide smart
growth law, SB 375. Known as the Blueprint, the Sacramento plan aims to reduce VMT from new growth
by 10 to 30 percent per capita and GHG by 15 to 40 percent per capita.
The Blueprint calls for higher land use densities and more infi ll development. The reduced development
area means less driving and fewer GHG emissions from transportation. In the base case scenario, in 2050
vehicle miles traveled per household increase by 12 percent, while in the Blueprint scenario, they decrease
by 17 percent.
New Fuels and Advanced Vehicles
The last fi ve chapters of this book examine the potential role for new fuels and vehicle technologies in
combating climate change. Johannes- Joerg Rueger, Senior Vice President for Engineering at Robert
Bosch LLC, one of the largest automotive suppliers in the world, addresses opportunities to reduce GHG
emissions by improving today’s gasoline and diesel engines. He notes that regulatory and industry attention
has recently focused on zero emission vehicles, but all are in demonstration or pre- commercialization
phases, and none are yet cost competitive with traditional gasoline and diesel vehicles. He focuses on the
many enhancements to internal combustion engines that are possible, such as start/ stop technologies,
gasoline direct injection, and turbocharging. These technologies promise GHG reductions at relatively low
costs. Additional hybridization offers even more signifi cant CO 2 reduction potential.
The chapter by K. G. Duleep, Managing Director at ICF International, summarizes recent analyses of new
developments in technologies to improve the fuel economy of LDVs, including cars and light trucks. Like
Rueger of Bosch, he notes that while the popular press focuses much of its attention on advanced electric
vehicles, manufacturer product plans show that improvements to the existing engine and drivetrain will
continue to be the major focus of efforts over the next decade. Improvements to conventional technology
can reduce GHG emissions by 33 percent in 2016 and by up to 50 percent in 2025.
Hybrid technology will provide even greater reductions, and plug- in electric vehicle technology even more,
but it may be premature to judge these technologies. Over the next fi ve to 10 years, understandings of
8 Sperling and Cannon
Chapter 1 Climate and Transportation Solutions
battery costs and durability will improve, allowing better vehicle design decisions. This could help create
cost- effective plug- in hybrid and battery electric models as the next wave of technology improvements
takes effect in the post- 2025 period.
The focus shifts from LDVs to heavy duty vehicles in the chapter by Anthony Greszler, Vice President of
Government and Industry Relations at Volvo Powertrain North America. He focuses on heavy trucks and
buses, which account for 21 percent of U. S. transport petroleum consumption. Globally, these vehicles
could well surpass light duty passenger vehicles to become the largest users of petroleum and emitters of
CO 2 within the transport sector.
The energy effi ciency of diesel engines improved approximately 10 percent from 1980 until 1999, but
increasingly stringent nitrogen oxide emission requirements have slowed progress in effi ciency. Nonetheless,
the desire for GHG emission reductions through effi ciency improvements is leading toward advancements in
fuel injection, air induction, and combustion chamber design for diesel engines. More advanced combustion
designs promise even greater reductions.
The chapter by James Winebrake of the Rochester Institute of Technology and his colleague James Corbett
of the University of Delaware addresses the use of trucks and other modes to move goods. Winebrake and
Corbett explore the potential for mode shifting, but fi nd relatively small opportunities. They suggest that
expected benefi ts from freight mode shifting are often overstated. They argue for a more holistic approach
to effi ciency improvements in the freight sector, noting that the freight industries are closely tied to economic
activity, much more so than passenger transport.
Finally, Andrew Lutz and Jay Keller from Sandia National Laboratories in California argue in their chapter
that the best transportation solutions may come from combinations of alternative fuels and advanced
vehicle technologies. They focus on vehicle electrifi cation and conduct an extensive analysis of the
potential reductions from vehicle and electricity generation improvements. They conclude that incremental
improvements to existing vehicle and generation technologies can barely offset continued growth in transport
demand, and that the magnitude of the GHG emissions problem requires that research and development be
directed toward technologies that both greatly improve end use effi ciency and greatly reduce or eliminate
carbon from fuels. Energy policy needs to be established today, they argue, to motivate the transition to
net- zero carbon technologies.
References
U. S. Energy Information Administration ( EIA). 2009. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2008.
www. eia. doe. gov. Accessed January 25, 2010
9
Chapter 2:
Scenarios for Cutting Carbon Dioxide in Transport 70 Percent
Worldwide by 2050
by Lew Fulton
Worldwide, transport accounted for about 19 percent of global energy use and 23 percent of energy- related
carbon dioxide ( CO 2 ) emissions in 2006, and these shares will likely rise in the future. Given current trends,
transport energy use and CO 2 emissions are projected to increase nearly 50 percent by 2030 and more
than 80 percent by 2050.
This future is not sustainable. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC)
advises that, to avoid the worst impacts from climate change, global CO 2 emissions must be cut at least
in half by 2050. To achieve this, transport will have to play a signifi cant role. Even with deep cuts from all
other energy sectors, if transport does not cut CO 2 emissions well below current levels by 2050, it will be
very diffi cult to meet targets, such as stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gas ( GHG) emissions in
the atmosphere at a level of 450 parts per million ( ppm) of CO 2 equivalents ( CO 2- eq ).
This paper develops analysis originally published in the International Energy Agency ( IEA) Energy
Technology Perspectives 2008 ( ETP 2008) and the forthcoming IEA report Transport, Energy and CO 2 :
Moving Toward Sustainability ( IEA 2009). It describes how the introduction and widespread adoption of
new vehicle technologies and fuels, along with some shifting in passenger and freight transport to more
effi cient modes, can result in a 70 percent reduction in transport CO 2- eq emissions in 2050 compared to the
IEA baseline projection, which itself refl ects a 40 percent reduction below 2005 levels. As part of a broader
effort to cut emissions across the energy economy, this may be suffi cient to help stabilize atmospheric CO 2
at average concentrations between 450 and 550 ppm and prevent temperature changes above 2o Celsius
( C), according to the IPCC.
But substantially changing transport trends along the lines described here will not be easy. It will require
both the widespread adoption of current best available technology and the longer term development
and deployment of a range of new technologies. All transport modes will need to reduce their emissions
signifi cantly compared to the baseline trends, in every region of the world. Although some technologies
and measures appear to be available at low or even negative cost, strong policies will be needed to ensure
rapid uptake and full use of these technologies and to encourage sensible changes in travel patterns. It
must involve industry, governments, and consumers. In many cases the rate of change that will be needed
for the market penetration of new technologies and vehicle types is much faster than has occurred in recent
____________________
L. Fulton is Senior Transport Energy Analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, France. This chapter is
copyrighted as follows: © OECD/ IEA, 2010
10 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
decades. Large and risky investments will be needed from industry and for the purchases of new types of
vehicles by consumers. The challenge to reach the targets described here should not be underestimated.
The Baseline Scenario
Based on recent and expected future trends, in particular population and gross domestic product ( GDP)
per capita, it is possible to construct a business as usual scenario that suggests a possible future, if there
are not strong deviations from the current path. The IEA World Energy Outlook 2008 provides a reference
case scenario that assumes no new policies are implemented and that growth in activity and energy use
follows growth in population and GDP roughly as it has in the past, though certain saturation points may
be reached, for example, car ownership in wealthy countries ( IEA 2008b). The IEA Energy Technology
Perspectives 2008 extends this to 2050 in a baseline scenario ( IEA 2008a). For transport, this results in
more than a doubling in global transport activity measured by passenger kilometers of travel and a near
doubling of energy use. Average transport energy intensity improves somewhat over time, but not nearly
enough to offset travel growth and prevent energy use from growing.
For this analysis, a second business- as- usual case was developed that assumes higher growth rates in
travel, car ownership, and related indicators. This scenario results in a 130 percent increase in transport
energy use by 2050. These and other projections are shown in Figure 2- 1. In the baseline and high
baseline cases, the mix of fuels remains fairly constant, with petroleum fuels dominant. In the high baseline
case, after 2030, biofuels and synthetic gasoline and diesel produced from natural gas and coal grow
rapidly as they become competitive with petroleum as oil supplies dwindle.
Figure 2- 2 shows the CO 2 implications of the baseline and high baseline scenarios. Like energy use,
CO 2- eq emissions nearly double in the baseline scenario from 7.5 gigatonnes ( Gt) in 2005 to 14 GT in 2050
and grow by about 140 percent in the high baseline scenario to about 18 Gt in 2050. In this fi gure, and
throughout this paper except where noted, GHG emissions include CO 2 emissions from vehicles, and CO 2 ,
methane, and nitrogen oxide emissions from fuel production. It does not include other GHGs, such as
water from aircraft or sulfur oxides from shipping.
The scenarios shown in Figure 2- 2 are clearly unsustainable from both an energy and CO 2 point of view.
The remainder of this paper focuses on alternative, low CO 2 scenarios and how these can be achieved.
Figure 2- 1: Energy use scenarios
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
11 Fulton
Recent Transport Trends Around the World
The growth in energy use and CO 2 emissions in the baseline and high baseline cases is driven by expected
increases in travel that are mostly a function of increasing car ownership and air travel, both in turn driven
by rising incomes around the world. While travel data are still scarce for many countries, the IEA has
collected enough data to be able to make some initial estimates of total travel worldwide and by region that
provide at least order- of- magnitude estimates of where things stand and where they may be headed.
Figure 2- 3 shows estimated passenger travel by mode for regions including and excluding nations belonging
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD and non- OECD, respectively) in
2005, and projected in the baseline scenario to 2050. It shows that total passenger travel in non- OECD
countries is expected to soar between 2005 and 2050 and to far surpass travel within the OECD region by
2050.
Figure 2- 2: Summary of GHG reductions by scenario
Figure 2- 3: Passenger travel by region and mode, 2005 and 2050
12 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Figure 2- 4 shows the same data on a per capita basis. The data show that levels of travel per capita in
the developing world are currently far below those in OECD countries, and that travel will grow faster in
the developing world than within OECD nations. This is not surprising since population and incomes are
expected to grow faster in the developing world, and travel starts from a much smaller base so there is
signifi cant potential for a latent demand for travel. However, travel levels per capita in 2050 in non- OECD
regions remain well below those in OECD regions, suggesting that even then, travel will not have equalized
around the world. Growth may continue to grow rapidly in developing countries for many more decades.
In addition, in all regions the growth in travel in the baseline scenario is expected to be mostly by light duty
vehicles ( LDVs) and air. Rail and bus travel levels are not expected to growth substantially, and as a result,
will lose market share fairly dramatically.
A central driver for the changes in passenger travel in the future is expected to be growth in car ownership.
Figure 2- 5 shows the IEA projections of car ownership as a function of income growth in countries and
regions around the world, through 2050, based on income growth projections and car ownership data in
each region. In the baseline scenario, car ownership in most developing countries is assumed to be at
a relatively low level for a given income in the future, following the examples of countries like Japan and,
especially, South Korea over the past two to three decades. In the high baseline scenario, countries are
assumed to have car ownership levels that are closer to European country levels at a given income. The
difference in the results for these two types of assumptions is dramatic. In the baseline scenario, car
ownership reaches about 2.1 billion passenger LDVs by 2050, compared to about 800 million in 2005. In
the high baseline, car ownership approaches 3 billion cars.
The BLUE Map Scenario: A Sustainable Pathway for Transport
In order to change the directions, it will be necessary to radically alter transport activity trends. The IEA has
explored several scenarios of low CO 2 futures and their implications for how transport must change and
what can help bring about the needed changes.
The BLUE Map scenario is the low- CO 2 scenario developed by the IEA. It forecasts a 70 percent reduction
in CO 2 emissions in 2050 compared to the baseline scenario and a 30 percent decrease compared to
Figure 2- 4: Passenger travel per capita by region and mode, 2005 and 2050
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
13 Fulton
2005 levels. This dramatic reduction can be achieved through the uptake of technologies and alternative
fuels across all transport modes that cost up to $ 200 ( U. S. dollars) per metric ton of CO 2 saved. Under
this scenario, improvements in transport energy effi ciency offer the largest and least expensive reductions,
at least over the next ten years. Adoption of advanced vehicle technologies and new fuels also provides
important contributions to this scenario, especially after 2020. The impacts in terms of energy use reductions
in 2050 are shown above in Figure 2- 1 in terms of CO 2 in Figure 2- 2.
Vehicle Effi ciency Improvements
A principal fi nding of the BLUE Map analysis is that the implementation of incremental fuel economy
technologies could cost- effectively cut the fuel use and CO 2 emissions per kilometer of new LDVs 30
percent by 2020 and 50 percent by 2030 worldwide. Similar effi ciency improvements may be possible
for other modes, although the estimation of technology potentials for trucks, ships, and aircraft is not as
accurate as it is for LDVs in this analysis. Further, many of the available improvements for these modes are
expected to occur in the baseline scenario, which includes stock average improvements of 20 to 25 percent
by 2050. The 30 to 50 percent reduction in fuel use per kilometer traveled for trucks, ships, and aircraft
by 2050 appears possible, however. For all modes and types of vehicles, the identifi cation and setting of
effi ciency targets for the 2020 to 2030 time frame would be valuable to help stimulate and coordinate action,
particularly if backed by the development of policies around the world to help achieve these targets.
A 30 to 50 percent improvement in new vehicle effi ciency across modes by 2030 would help to achieve a
stock average improvement of a similar magnitude by 2050. In the BLUE Map scenario, this cuts transport
energy use and CO 2 enough to stabilize it at 2005 levels. To go well below 2005 levels, switching to new
low- CO 2 fuels and reducing growth in vehicle use will need to play increasingly important roles.
Alternative Fuels
In the baseline scenario, petroleum- based fuels continue to provide over 90 percent of all transport fuel
in 2050, while in the high baseline, an increasing share of very high CO 2 fuels, such as coal- to- liquids,
Figure 2- 5: Car ownership growth in the baseline and high baseline cases
14 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
contribute to rapidly increasing CO 2 emissions. By contrast, the share of petroleum and other fossil fuel
use falls to below 50 percent in the BLUE Map scenario. They are replaced by a combination of advanced,
low CO 2 biofuels, electricity, and hydrogen. Any one of these options has the potential to be suffi cient to
achieve the targets set in the BLUE Map scenario, but each also has drawbacks and may not reach its
full potential. A combination can maximize the chances of overall success, even if it would result in higher
investment costs to develop adequate production and distribution infrastructures. Pursuing a combination,
at least in the initial stage, appears wise to maximize the potential benefi ts, while limiting costs.
Ethanol from sugar cane can already provide low cost biofuels today, and increasingly does. Advanced
second generation biofuels such as lignocellulosic ethanol and biodiesel derived from biomass appear
to have the best long- term potential to provide sustainable, low lifecycle GHG fuels, but more research,
development, and demonstration will be needed before commercial scale production is likely to occur. For
all biofuels, important sustainability questions must be resolved, such as the impact of production on food
security, water supply, and sensitive ecosystems as a result of land use changes. A 20- fold increase in
biofuels is needed to achieve the outcomes envisaged in the BLUE Map scenario by 2050. If done wisely,
this should be possible using biomass waste strams where possible and only a small share of global
agricultural land.
Advanced Vehicle Technologies
Battery electric vehicles ( BEVs), plug- in hybrid electric vehicles ( PHEVs), and fuel cell electric vehicles
( FCVs) play an important role in the BLUE map scenario, especially after 2020. BEVs are rapidly emerging
as an important option, especially as lithium ion battery costs decline. It now appears that batteries in high-volume
production might cost as little as $ 500 per kilowatt hour ( kWh) in the near term. This is low enough
to bring the battery cost for a BEV with a 150 kilometer ( km) driving range down to about $ 15,000. This
is still very expensive, but with savings from removing the internal combustion engine, relatively low- cost
electricity as the fuel, and government incentives, this cost might be low enough to allow BEVs to achieve
commercial success over the next fi ve to ten years. Additional policy assistance, such as support for the
development of an appropriate recharging infrastructure, will still be needed, however. The cost of oil, the
principal competing fuel with electricity, will also be an important factor.
Since the impact of BEVs on CO 2 emissions depends on the CO 2 intensity of electricity generation, it would
make sense to deploy BEVs fi rst in those regions with already low CO 2 generation or a fi rm commitment to
move in that direction. This would include Japan, the European Union, California, and parts of North and
South America.
A potentially important transition step to BEVs is represented by PHEVs. By increasing the battery storage in
HEVs and offering a plug- in option, these vehicles represent an important step toward vehicle electrifi cation
that builds incrementally on an emerging hybrid vehicle technology. Like HEVs, PHEVs use both engine
and motor, which adds cost. The advantage of PHEVs lies in providing a potentially signifi cant share of
driving on electricity with a small, and therefore relatively inexpensive, battery pack. For example, an 8 kWh
battery pack might cost $ 5,000 to $ 6,000 in the near term and provide 40 km of driving range on electricity.
For many drivers, this could cut oil use by 50 percent or more. PHEVs also require less new infrastructure
than pure BEVs, since the car is not dependent solely on electricity and has a full driving range on liquid
fuel.
As shown in Figure 2- 6, both BEVs and PHEVs are initially deployed in 2010 in the BLUE Map scenario and
increase in sales to well over one million vehicles per year by 2020. BEVs and PHEVs experience rapid
market penetration around the world, each reaching annual sales of around 50 million by 2050, primarily as
passenger LDVs, but also in a small share of trucks. The widespread introduction of BEVs illustrated in the
BLUE Map scenario requires adequate investments and coordination among governments and industry
for the development of recharging infrastructure. In a separate scenario called BLUE EV Success, in which
BEVs almost fully dominate LDV sales by 2050, their sales exceed 100 million vehicles per year.
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
15 Fulton
Hydrogen FCVs also play a key role in the BLUE Map scenario. FCVs share the market with BEVs and are
produced commercially beginning around 2020. They reach a signifi cant sales share by 2030. Sales then
rise rapidly to nearly 60 million vehicles by 2050. Recent cost reductions in fuel cell systems for vehicles
increase the likelihood that FCVs can eventually become commercialized, although costs and onboard
energy storage are still important concerns. As battery costs drop, hybridizing fuel cells appears increasingly
attractive, since batteries can help provide peak power to the motor, thereby allowing a smaller fuel cell
stack to be used and improving effi ciency through regenerative braking. The development of a hydrogen
production and distribution infrastructure is necessary and will require substantial new investments. Like
electricity, hydrogen must be produced with low CO 2 technologies in order for FCVs to provide signifi cant
CO 2 reductions. This will result in higher hydrogen costs than if produced from fossil fuels, for example, by
reforming natural gas.
Figure 2- 6: LDV sales and sales shares by vehicle type in BLUE map
Figure 2- 7: CO 2 intensity of different modes by year and scenario
16 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Vehicle effi ciency improvements and the shift to lower carbon fuels results in a dramatic decarbonization of
all types of transportation by 2050. Figure 2- 7 shows that the average CO 2 intensity of different modes will
drop dramatically by 2050 in the BLUE Map scenario, reaching well below 50 grams of CO 2- eq emissions per
km of driving for all modes except air travel. This means that modal shift would provide less CO 2 benefi t
than it does currently. Since there is no guarantee that such CO 2 intensity reductions will be achieved,
however, modal shift options make sense as a complement to vehicle and fuel options to reduce CO 2 .
The BLUE Shifts Scenario
Certainly in cities around the world, development that minimizes the need for private motorized travel should
be a high priority given the strong cobenefi ts in terms of reduced traffi c congestion, pollutant emissions, and
general liveability.
The BLUE Shifts scenario considers one possible future modal mix, in contrast to the one implied in the
baseline scenario. This scenario relies on more uncertain information compared to other projections. It
has been developed by the IEA to provide a basis for estimating the important potential energy and CO 2
impacts of modal shifts.
As shown in Figure 2- 8, the BLUE Shifts scenario envisages an average worldwide reduction in private LDV
and aviation passenger travel of 25 percent by 2050 relative to the baseline scenario, and up to a 50 percent
reduction compared to the high baseline scenario. In addition, it includes a shift in freight movement to rail
transport that reduces long- haul truck transport growth between 2010 and 2050 by half. Shifting travel and
goods transport to advanced bus and rail systems, with some outright reductions in travel growth due to
better land use planning, improved non- motorized transport infrastructure, and some telecommunications
substitution for travel, could yield a 20 percent reduction in energy use by 2050 compared to the baseline,
or a 40 percent reduction compared to the high baseline scenario. Even more ambitious mode shifting may
be possible, but this will require strong policies and political will.
The BLUE Map/ Shifts Scenario
When the impacts of improved effi ciency, low carbon fuels, and advanced vehicles and modal shift are
combined in the BLUE Map/ Shifts scenario, CO 2 emissions in transport are cut by 40 percent in 2050
Figure 2- 8: Percentage changes in passenger travel by mode, region, and
urban/ non- urban, BLUE Shifts scenario compared to baseline in 2050
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
17 Fulton
compared to 2005, and by 70 percent compared to the baseline scenario in 2050, as shown earlier in Figure
2- 2. This represents a 10 Gt reduction from the 14 Gt that would otherwise be emitted by the transport
system in 2050 in the baseline scenario and a 14 Gt reduction compared to the 18 Gt in the high baseline
scenario. After 2050, further modal shifting and effi ciency improvements, and the deeper penetration of low
CO 2 alternative fuels, will be needed to keep transport on a downward CO 2 trend.
As shown in Figure 2- 9, the change in CO 2 varies considerably by region, with OECD regions experiencing
deep reductions compared to 2005 levels, and most non- OECD regions staying near or slightly above
2005 levels, although far lower than their CO 2 growth in the baseline scenario. All world regions must
deeply decarbonize transport by 2050 compared to baseline scenario trends if the overall targets are to be
achieved.
Modal Findings and Policy Considerations
It will be extremely challenging for transport to achieve the outcomes implicit in the BLUE Map/ Shifts
scenario. Very strong policies will be needed, both to encourage development and implementation of
alternatives and to encourage consumers and businesses to embrace these alternatives. The following
sections outline the contribution from the different modes and the policies that will be needed.
The four most important modes, in terms of their expected contribution to CO 2 in the baseline scenario in
2050, are LDVs, which account for 43 percent of the reductions, trucks with 21 percent, aviation with 20
percent, and shipping with 8 percent. In the BLUE Map/ Shifts scenario, the role for buses and rail increases
signifi cantly and CO 2 reductions from effi ciency improvements and alternative fuel use in these modes
become increasingly important, though they are already quite effi cient.
Light Duty Vehicles
Passenger LDV ownership around the world is expected to rise mainly as a function of income. In the
baseline scenario, the total LDV stock increases from about 700 million in 2005 to nearly two billion by
2050. One obvious impact of this growth is a similar increase in the rate of fuel use, unless vehicles
become far more effi cient than they are today. Modal shifts to mass transit, walking and cycling, and long-distance
bus and rail systems could also help reduce fuel use by encouraging people to use alternatives to
cars more often.
Figure 2- 9: Transport CO 2 emissions by region, year, and scenario
18 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Based on IEA analysis and various other recent studies ( e. g. Cheah et al 2007), it seems possible, and is
likely to be cost effective even at relatively low oil prices, to achieve a 50 percent reduction in fuel use per
kilometer for new LDVs around the world by 2030, relative to 2005 levels, from incremental technology
improvements and electric hybridization. Net negative CO 2 reduction costs are achievable at least for much
of this improvement, but it will be important to ensure that the effi ciency gains are not simply offset by trends
toward larger, heavier, and faster cars. Policies will be needed to ensure that maximum uptake of effi ciency
technologies occurs and that the benefi ts are translated into fuel economy improvement. Fuel economy
standards, perhaps complemented by CO 2 - based vehicle registration fees, can play an important role in
OECD countries. It is important that non- OECD countries adopt similar policies, and that all countries
continue to update these policies in the future, rather than letting policies expire. The Global Fuel Economy
Initiative ( GFEI 2009) is focused on helping achieve such outcomes.
Advanced technology vehicles will need to play an increasingly important role, especially after 2020.
Initiatives to promote BEVs and PHEVs, and the continuing development of FCVs, will be important. The
BLUE Map scenario includes annual sales of over fi ve million PHEVs and two million BEVs by 2020, rising
to around 50 million of each type of vehicle by 2050. It also predicts sales of tens of millions of FCVs by
2050. For governments, undertaking ongoing RD& D programs to cut technology costs, orchestrating the
co- development of vehicle and battery production, recharging and hydrogen infrastructure, and providing
incentives to ensure suffi cient consumer demand to support market growth will be important near- term
activities. Selecting certain regions or metropolitan areas that are keen to be early adopters of new vehicle
types may be an effective approach.
Biofuels for LDVs and other transportation modes could play an important role, but their use may be
limited by the availability of sustainable and truly low- CO 2 feedstocks. Second generation biofuels from
lignocellulosic and other non- food feedstocks reach about 25 percent of LDV transport fuel by 2050 in the
BLUE Map scenario, nearly 20 times 2008 levels worldwide. Fuel compatibility with vehicles is not likely
to be a signifi cant problem, needing only minor modifi cations to new vehicles in the future. A transition
is needed to much more sustainable feedstocks and approaches to biofuels production, however. As
sustainability criteria and rating systems emerge, policies need to shift toward incentivizing the most
sustainable, low- CO 2 , and cost- effi cient biofuels, while minimizing impacts from land use changes. CO 2
differentiation through the low carbon fuel standard now in effect in California ( CARB 2009) represents an
important step. A transition to second generation production techniques is particularly needed in OECD
countries, since their current biofuels production is dominated by ethanol from grain crops and biodiesel
from oil- seed crops. These compete with food and animal feed supplies and are costly in terms of CO 2
cost- per- tonne or land use effi ciency.
Shifting passenger travel to more effi cient modes, such as urban rail and advanced bus systems, can play
an important role in cutting CO 2 , and they often provide other important benefi ts, including reduced traffi c
congestion, lower pollutant emissions, and more liveable cities. Policies need to focus on better urban
design to cut the need for motorized travel, improving transit systems to make them much more attractive,
and improving infrastructure to make it easier to walk and cycle for short trips. Rapidly growing cities in
developing countries have the opportunity to move toward far less car- oriented development than has
occurred in many cities in OECD countries, but it will take strong measures and political will and support for
alternative investment paradigms.
Figure 2- 10 shows the role and estimated marginal cost of different technologies and fuels in contributing
to CO 2 reductions from LDVs in the BLUE Map scenario in 2050, under $ 60 and $ 120 per barrel oil price
assumptions. These curves are uncertain, and sensitive to small changes in assumptions. Modal shifts
and non- LDV modes are not included due to cost uncertainties. Costs for 2050 for technologies and fuels
shown in the fi gure are partly dependent on earlier deployment, which triggers learning and cost reductions.
The curves show the particular combination of technology and fuels options that are deployed in the BLUE
Map scenario, but other combinations could also achieve the same or similar outcomes in terms of CO 2
reductions.
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
19 Fulton
Despite the uncertainties, the results are revealing. By 2050, deep reductions in CO 2- eq GHG emissions
from LDVs on the order of 5 Gt appear possible at a marginal cost of about $ 210 per metric ton with oil at
$ 60 per barrel. A second case, assuming a higher oil price of $ 120 per barrel, is also shown. At this higher
oil price, the emissions reductions are achieved at a marginal cost of about $ 130 per metric ton. Most of
the emissions reduction is achieved at costs far below this. In earlier years, particularly up to 2030, most
cost reductions come from incremental improvements to conventional vehicles and hybridization at very
low average cost.
Trucks and Freight Movement
Trucking has been one of the fastest growing transport modes over the past few decades. This growth is
likely to continue, although possibly with some decoupling from GDP as an increasing share of economic
growth comes from information and other non- material sectors. Trucks have also become more effi cient.
Even so, there remain major opportunities to improve effi ciency through technical measures, operational
changes such as driver training, and implementation of logistical systems to improve effi ciency in the
handling and routing of goods.
Better technologies, including improved engines, light- weighting, better aerodynamics, and better tires, can
probably make vehicles 30 to 40 percent more effi cient by 2030. Many of the improvements appear likely to
be cost effective, although signifi cant market failures are evident in terms of truck operators failing to adopt
cost- effective technologies. In addition, using a societal cost basis for analysis of options increases cost
effectiveness well beyond private cost analysis. Logistic systems to ensure better use of trucks and shifts
to larger trucks can provide additional effi ciency gains system- wide, and may also be quite cost effective.
To maximize the gains, governments will need to work with trucking companies, for example, by supporting
driver training programs, and to create incentives or requirements for improved effi ciency. Japan’s Top
Runner effi ciency requirements for trucks are the fi rst of their kind in the world ( JFS 2009).
For many trucks, shifting to electricity or hydrogen as a main fuel will be diffi cult due to driving range
requirements and energy storage limitations. Thus, the development of second generation biofuels may
Notes: SI = spark ignition, gasoline vehicle; CI = compression ignition diesel vehicle; ICE = internal
combustion engine vehicle; hybrid refers to hybrid electric vehicle; BTL = biomass- to- liquids biodiesel.
Figure 2- 10: GHG reductions in BLUE Map for light- duty vehicles and fuels:
contribution and estimated cost per tonne by vehicle and fuel type in 2050
20 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
be the only way to substantially decarbonize trucking fuel. Trucks can be easily adapted to burn biodiesel,
especially the very high quality biodiesel that is produced by biomass gasifi cation and liquefaction. In the
BLUE Map scenario, trucks achieve a 40 percent reduction in energy intensity per metric ton- km, and shift
30 percent of their remaining fuel demand to advanced biofuels by 2050.
Shifting some freight from truck to rail can be an attractive option to save energy and cut CO 2 emissions,
due to the high energy effi ciency of rail movement. Many countries move only a small share of goods by
rail, but to achieve shifts, very large investments in rail and intermodal systems will be necessary.
Aviation
Air travel is expected to be the fastest growing transport mode in the future. Air passenger kilometers
increase by a factor of four between 2005 and 2050 in the baseline scenario, and by a factor of fi ve in the
high baseline scenario. It is expected to grow even faster than income during normal economic cycles.
Aviation also benefi ts from steady effi ciency improvements in each generation of aircraft, which is likely to
continue.
Given the expected very high rate of growth, aviation energy use and CO 2 emissions are expected to triple
in the baseline scenario and quadruple in the high baseline scenario. An increase in the rate of effi ciency
improvements beyond baseline rates may be possible, for example, by encouraging aircraft manufacturers
to make bigger gains with each generation of aircraft and by improving air traffi c control systems. A wide
range of fuel effi ciency technologies for aircraft remain unexploited, including aerodynamic improvements,
weight reduction, and engine effi ciency. The estimated potential for improvement suggests that the average
aircraft may be nearly twice as effi cient in 2050 as it is today.
Table 2.1: Fuel savings and costs from new generation planes
Parameter B767 B787 B747- 400 B747- 800
Seat Capacity 250 250 460 467
Load factor 80 80 80 80
Energy intensity ( MJ/ seat- km) 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.4
Fuel use L per plane km 10.8 7.4 18.6 14.7
Annual plane- kilometres of travel per
year ( million) 2 2 2 2
Annual fuel consumption ( million l) 22 15 38 30
Annual savings ( million USD, @ USD
120/ bbl or about USD 0.90/ L) 6.4 8.6
Savings over 30 years, 10% discount
rate, USD millions 60 81
Savings over 30 years, 3% discount
rate, USD millions 125 169
Approximate aircraft purchase costs
( USD millions) 150 190 230 280
Purchase Cost Difference ( USD
millions) 40 50
Sources: IEA estimates based on aircraft data from Boeing’s website ( Boeing 2009) and
previous reports. Airplane cost data from Air Guide Online, 2009
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
21 Fulton
Improved air traffi c control can also improve the overall fuel effi ciency of aviation by between 5 and 10
percent. More work is needed to better understand the cost effectiveness of various options, although
available estimates suggest that some available options may be quite attractive. One signifi cant factor in
assessing technology cost/ benefi t for aircraft is that aircraft burn large quantities of fuel over their lifetimes.
Up to one billion liters of jet fuel can be burned in a large airplane over its lifetime. Cutting fuel use can
provide enormous fuel cost savings. Thus, major investments to improve aircraft effi ciency may be cost
effective.
The fuel savings associated with two recent aircraft replacements are shown in Table 2- 1. A host of new
upgrades and features may justify much of the higher cost. Even so, fuel savings alone over 30 years,
assuming a 10 percent discount rate and fuel costs of $ 0.90 per liter, fully offset the higher plane cost.
Using a 3 percent societal discount rate, fuel savings are far greater than the higher plane cost. This also
reveals the fact that, over the 30- year minimum equipment life for aircraft, using a 3 percent discount rate
instead of a 10 percent rate doubles the value of fuel savings, in turn indicating that far greater investments
in aircraft effi ciency are justifi able from a societal point of view than a private or corporate point of view.
Measures such as CO 2 taxes to encourage faster introduction of new technologies refl ecting very high
societal benefi ts on successive generations of aircraft can help. International agreements can place a price
on or limit aviation GHG emissions. However, GHG reduction is complicated by the fact that CO 2 is just
one of several aircraft emissions that have radiative forcing, or warming, effects. Others include nitrogen
oxides, methane, and water vapor. More work is needed to better understand the net effects and optimal
strategies for reducing overall aviation GHG emissions.
Even more than trucks, aircraft are restricted in the types of fuels they can use. The energy density of fuels
is critical for providing adequate aircraft fl ying range. Shifting from energy dense liquid fuels to gaseous
fuels or electricity appears impractical. Liquefi ed hydrogen may be a viable option, but its use would require
major compromises in other airplane design features. High energy- dense biodiesel fuels, therefore, are
of great interest to the airline industry, including aircraft manufacturers, as they may hold the best hope of
providing low- CO 2 fuels.
In the BLUE Map scenario, 30 percent of aircraft fuel is second generation biofuel by 2050. The BLUE
Map/ Shifts scenario predicts a cut in air travel growth by 25 percent, resulting in a tripling by 2050 rather
than quadrupling. This will occur naturally if alternatives such as high- speed rail systems are provided,
but it must also be encouraged by policies that help ensure the availability and cost- competitiveness of rail
travel. Substituting telematics, such as teleconferencing, for some long- distance trips could also play an
important role.
Shipping
International water- borne shipping has grown very rapidly in recent years, in particular as a function of
the growth in Asian manufacturing and exports to other countries. Transoceanic shipping now represents
about 90 percent of all shipping energy use. The remainder is river and coastal shipping. Container
shipping fuel use has risen faster than any other ship category, and it may continue to rise rapidly in the
future. The average size of ships is also rising, such that shipping is becoming steadily more effi cient per
metric ton- km moved.
Ship effi ciency has not been improving signifi cantly in recent years. The structure of the shipping industry,
with fragmented and very different systems of ownership, operation, and registration, often involving several
different countries for a single ship, may serve to limit the market incentives to optimize ship effi ciency.
The IEA has identifi ed about 50 effi ciency improvement measures for shipping ( IEA 2009). If most were
adopted, a 50 percent or greater reduction in energy use per metric ton- km could be achieved. More
economic research is needed, but recent studies suggest that many options for retrofi tting existing ships
could achieve substantial energy and CO 2 savings at very low or net negative cost.
22 Fulton
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
As for aircraft, biofuels are likely to be important for the decarbonization of shipping fuel. Ship engines are
capable of using a wide range of fuels, and may be able to use relatively low quality, low cost biofuels. In
the BLUE Map scenario, 30 percent of shipping fuel is low GHG biofuel by 2050.
Policies to promote improved international shipping effi ciency and CO 2 reduction may have to come from
international agreements. Shipping could be included in a CO 2 cap- and- trade system. Another proposal
has been to develop a ship effi ciency index and score all new and existing ships using the index. This
could be coupled with international incentives or regulations on new ship effi ciency and used to encourage
modifi cations to existing ships, given that many effi ciency retrofi t opportunities for existing ships are available.
More work is needed to develop such an index, and in particular to estimate the effi ciency benefi ts and
costs for various types of improvements. The UN International Maritime Organisation is playing a lead role
in such efforts.
Conclusions
It appears that, by 2050, it should be possible to cut transport energy use and CO 2 emissions nearly in half
compared to baseline projections through effi ciency improvements, and by nearly half again by substitution
of very low- CO 2 alternative fuels, mainly electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. Modal shifting can also help,
particularly in the 2010 to 2030 time frame, before private modes, such as LDVs, have become signifi cantly
decarbonized.
While CO 2 reduction costs are uncertain, the effi ciency improvements should be, on average, cost effective,
with an average cost per metric ton for LDVs near zero using a societal discount rate. The costs of many
options available for trucks, ships, and aircraft appear near zero on a cost per metric ton basis, but costs are
uncertain at the margin. The biggest uncertainty, however, is the cost for producing large numbers of BEVs
or FCVs. If targeted cost reductions are achieved, these technologies should provide CO 2 reductions by
2050 at net costs below $ 200 per metric ton, and perhaps below $ 100 per metric ton. However, in a more
pessimistic scenario, with fewer cost reductions, the costs of these technologies may well exceed $ 200 per
metric ton.
International cooperation to move things in the right direction will be critical. A signifi cant reduction in CO 2
emissions in transport will be possible only if all world regions contribute. Although transport emissions per
capita are far higher today in OECD than in non- OECD countries, nearly 90 percent of all the future CO 2
growth is expected to come from non- OECD countries. In the IEA BLUE scenarios, all regions cut transport
CO 2 dramatically compared to the baseline in 2050. Vehicles can be made more effi cient in all regions of
the world, generating large fuel savings worldwide. Changes in travel can also occur, although in many
countries the main priority is to preserve current low- energy travel modes. Alternative fuels, if their costs
can eventually approach those for oil- based fuels, will also contribute to CO 2 reductions worldwide.
Governments need to work together and with key stakeholders to ensure that markets around the world
send similar signals to consumers and manufacturers, in part to maximize effi ciency and limit the cost of
future changes. Common medium- and long- term targets in terms of fuel economy, alternative fuels use,
and modal shares would send clear signals to key players and help them plan for the future. For those
producing effi cient products, knowing that a wide range of markets will be eager for those products will help
plan production and, eventually, to cut costs. The Global Fuel Economy Initiative represents an important
example of moving toward greater international co- operation in developing targets and standards.
National governments need to develop and deploy new types of very low GHG vehicles and fuels.
Technologies such as BEVs and FCVs can only be introduced into markets where there is adequate refueling
infrastructure, and consumers willing and ready to purchase both the vehicles and the fuels. Markets
alone will have diffi culty achieving such outcomes. Governments around the world must orchestrate such
transitions and help overcome the risks involved.
Chapter 2 Climate and Transportation Solutions
23 Fulton
To put transport on a sustainable pathway over the coming 40 years, current trends must be changed
substantially within the next fi ve to ten years. Strong policies are needed to begin to shift long- term
trajectories and to meet interim targets. Strong measures are also needed in terms of investments in
infrastructure and incentives that can infl uence how people choose to travel.
References
Boeing. 2009. “ 747- 8 Fact Sheet.”
http:// www. boeing. com/ commercial/ 747family/ 747- 8_ fact_ sheet. html
California Air Resources Board ( CARB). 2009. Low Carbon Fuel Standard Program.
http:// www. arb. ca. gov/ fuels/ lcfs/ lcfs. htm
Lynette Cheah et al. 2007. Factor of Two: Halving the Fuel Consumption of New U. S. Automobiles by 2035.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Laboratory for Energy and Environment. Publication No. LFEE 2007- 04 RP.
Global Fuel Economy Initiative ( GFEI). 2009. http:// www. fi afoundation. org/ 50by50/ Pages/ homepage. aspx
International Energy Agency ( IEA). 2008a. Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050. Paris,
France: IEA.
______. 2008b. World Energy Outlook 2008. Paris, France: IEA.
______. 2009. Transport, Energy and CO 2 : Moving Toward Sustainability. Paris, France: IEA.
Japan for Sustainability ( JFS). 2009. “ Fuel Economy Standards Developed for Trucks & Buses.”
http:// www. japanfs. org/ en/ pages/ 026599. html
24
Chapter 3:
U. S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Transportation
Sector
by John Conti, Nicholas Chase, and John Maples
Transportation is the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases ( GHG) in the United States ( U. S.) among
the four end use sectors, which also include commercial, residential, and industrial end use sectors, with
emissions associated with electricity generation distributed to the sectors where electricity is consumed.
According to data collected by the U. S. Energy Information Administration ( EIA) and projected through its
National Energy Modeling System ( NEMS), GHG emissions in the transportation sector grew from 630
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent ( mmtCO 2e ) in 1950, representing 27 percent of the total U. S.
emissions, to 1,882 mmtCO 2e in 2009, representing 33 percent of the U. S. total ( EIA 2008).
GHG emissions in the transportation sector in the U. S. more than tripled between 1950 and 2009, but are
projected to remain relatively fl at between 2010 and 2030. Figure 3- 1 shows the trends in GHG emissions
____________________
J. Conti is Director of the Offi ce of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Nicholas Chase is an industry economist, and
J. Maples is an Operations Research Analyst with the U. S. Energy Information Administration in Washington, DC
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
GHG Emissions ( mmtco2e)
Transportation
Commerical
Residential
Industrial
Figure 3- 1: Historical and projected U. S. GHG emissions by end use sector, 1950- 2030
Source: EIA National Energy Modeling System Emissions Data
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
25 Conti et al.
by energy sector from 1950 to projected emissions in 2030. In the 1980s, transportation overtook the
industrial sector to become the largest emitting end use sector, driven by increased personal mobility as
rising income and low fuel prices stimulated motorization and the suburbanization during the era after the
end of World War II in what became the greatest migration in American history.
The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2009 updated reference case projects that the transportation sector’s GHG
emissions will increase from 1,905 mmtCO 2e in 2010 to 2,045 mmtCO 2e by 2030 ( EIA 2009a). Transportation’s
overall share of emissions is projected to remain at 33 percent throughout the forecast period, continuing its
distinction as the largest source of GHG emissions among U. S. end use sectors.
Total liquid fuel consumption in transportation, including petroleum motor gasoline and diesel, ethanol, and
biodiesel, is projected to grow from 164 billion gallons in 2000 to 196 billion gallons by 2030, as shown in
Figure 3- 2. Ethanol and biodiesel consumption is projected to grow from nearly zero in 2000 to 28 billion
gallons in 2030, with ethanol accounting for 26 billion gallons of the increase. Because emissions from
ethanol feedstock production and conversion are counted in the industrial end use sector, GHG emissions
from liquid fuel consumption reported for the transportation sector will remain almost fl at between 2000
and 2030. The sidebar discusses the accounting of GHG emissions from biofuel production and use in the
NEMS.
GHG Emissions in Transportation Modes
Between the years 1950 and 2000, the U. S. economy underwent a rapid expansion, growing from $ 293.7
billion in 1950 to $ 9.52 trillion by 2000, corresponding to a real disposable personal income increase from
$ 1,401 billion in 1950 to $ 8,161 billion by 2000.
This quintupling of real personal income drove a corresponding increase in the amount of vehicle miles
traveled. While these trends affected primarily the light duty vehicle ( LDV) sector, similar trends occurred in
other transportation sectors as the U. S. economy grew and wealth increased. Consumer demand increased
for a vast array of goods, which required the movement of large quantities of materials and industrial output
and increased the emissions from heavy duty vehicles. Similarly, the air travel mode became a major form
of travel as wealthier consumers demanded more air travel.
Figure 3- 3 shows the growth in transportation GHG emissions by transport mode from 1970 to 2005,
followed by a leveling off predicted to continue through 2030. Almost all the GHG emissions that resulted
from transportation demand over the past few decades have been derived from the combustion of petroleum
products.
Figure 3- 2: Total liquid fuel consumption in transportation
Source: EIA National Energy Modeling System Emissions Data
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2010 2020 2030
Billion Gallons
Biodies e l
Petroleum Diesel Fue l
Ethanol
Petroleum M otor
Gasoline
26 Conti et al.
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Since 2005, GHG emissions from the transportation sector have remained
relatively fl at and are projected to remain relatively fl at through 2030,
rising from 1,872 mmtCO 2e in 2000 to 1,904 mmtCO 2e in 2010, and 1,929
mmtCO 2e in 2020, before moving slightly upward to 2,045 mmtCO 2e in 2030.
Petroleum products will remain the overwhelming source of GHG emissions
in the transportation sector, but biofuels will also begin to play an important
role. Because of the accounting method used by the EIA, the growing use
of ethanol and the less signifi cant growth in the use of biodiesel across the
projection period explain in large part, but not entirely, why GHG emissions
in transportation have remained and are projected to remain relatively fl at
between 2000 and 2030.
Light duty vehicles ( LDVs) represent the single largest source of GHG
emissions in the transportation sector by a wide margin, accounting for
around 59 percent of total transportation emissions today. Throughout the
EIA projection period, LDV GHG emissions will continue to represent the
single largest emission source, although emissions are projected to decline
four percent as a result of higher fuel economy standards and the increasing
use of biofuels. Heavy duty truck GHG emissions are projected to increase
31 percent, growing from 17 percent of total transportation GHG emissions
in 2009 to 23 percent by 2030, furthering the heavy duty truck mode’s place
as the second largest overall GHG emitter in the transportation sector. GHG
emissions from air travel are projected to increase 36 percent, the highest
rate of increase in the forecast. Marine and rail are projected to grow, but
remain relatively minor sources of energy use and GHG emissions in the
U. S.
Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions
In 2009, LDVs, vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating up to 10,000 pounds
accounted for 1,104 mmtCO 2e out of a total of 1,882 mmtCO 2e . Emissions are
projected to decline to 1,062 mmtCO 2e in 2030, a decrease of 42 mmtCO 2e .
This decline will lower the LDV mode’s overall share of transportation GHG
emissions from 59 percent to 54 percent in 2030. Biofuels consumption in
LDVs is projected to increase to 28 billion gallons by 2030, which will offset
almost all of the growth in liquid fuel demand in the LDV fl eet.
Higher proposed fuel economy standards mandated by the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which require new LDVs to reach
a fuel economy of 35 miles per gallon ( mpg) by 2020, also contribute to the
decline in projected GHG emissions ( EISA 2007). As new vehicles enter the
LDV fl eet, the stock average fuel economy for those vehicles is projected to
increase from 20.5 mpg in 2009 to 24.6 mpg in 2020 and 28.9 mpg in 2030.
While the stock average fuel economy is projected to increase, the impact
on emissions is forecast to be strongest in the early part of the projection
period because of the continuing growth in overall LDV miles traveled ( VMT).
Total light duty VMT is forecast to increase from 2,856 billion miles in 2010
to 3,221 billion miles in 2020 and 3,936 billion miles in 2030. Between 2010
and 2020, the stock average fuel economy increases at a rate of 20 percent,
while VMT increases at a rate of only 13 percent; thus, GHG emissions are
driven downward. Combined with the increasing use of ethanol, emissions
decline between 2010 and 2020.
GHG Emissions
and Biofuels
Consumption of biofuels
produces varying amounts of
GHG emissions, depending
on the accounting for and
allocation of life cycle emis-sions,
including feedstocks
used, fuels consumed, and land
use emissions. In the NEMS,
GHG emissions from biofuels,
including both ethanol and
biodiesel, are calculated using
a fi eld- to- tailpipe accounting
method, with land use emis-sions
currently excluded and
emissions distributed across
various energy sectors. Due
to this accounting, full GHG
emissions are not accounted
for in the transportation end
use sector.
In transportation, vehicle GHG
emissions from biofuels are
assumed to be zero as they
are completely offset by the
growing of the feedstock.
Biofuel process emissions
are counted in the industrial
end use sector based on the
energy used in agriculture for
the production of crops and
in the production process of
turning the biofuel feedstock
into a transportation fuel. GHG
effects of direct or indirect
changes in land use are not
tracked in the NEMS.
The fact that GHG emissions
from biofuels feedstock pro-duction
and conversion pro-cesses,
excluding changes in
land use, are accounted for
in the NEMS outside of the
transportation end use sector
has signifi cant implications
for projecting emissions for
transportation because of the
projected growth of biofuel
used as a liquid transportation
fuel.
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
27 Conti et al.
Between 2020 and 2030, stock average fuel economy increases at a rate of only 17 percent, while VMT
grows at a rate of 22 percent, which, when combined with a growing use of biofuels, still leaves total LDV
GHG emissions lower in 2030 than 2010, but higher than 2020. If, beyond 2030, VMT continues to grow
and biofuels use and fuel economy do not continue to increase, LDV GHG emissions will begin to increase
again.
Heavy Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions
While LDV GHG emissions are projected to decline, heavy duty truck GHG emissions are projected to
increase 31 percent between 2009 and 2030, representing the largest absolute increase and the second
largest percentage increase in GHG emissions in the transportation sector during the forecast period. Heavy
duty truck GHG emissions are projected to grow from 17 percent of total transportation GHG emissions
in 2009 to 23 percent by 2030, continuing to place heavy duty trucks as the second largest overall GHG
emitter in the transportation sector.
The driving force behind this increase is the growth in heavy duty VMT from 226 billion miles in 2009 to 347
billion miles in 2030, which is itself driven by a corresponding growth in industrial output from $ 4,927 billion
2000 dollars to $ 7,391 billion by 2030. While heavy duty vehicle fuel economy is projected to increase, the
increase is not signifi cant enough to offset the growth in VMT.
Air GHG Emissions
GHG emissions from air travel are the third largest source of emissions in the transportation sector and
represent the fastest growing mode. Aircraft accounted for 179 mmtCO 2e of emissions in 2009, 10 percent
of total transportation emissions. GHG emissions in the air mode are projected to increase 65 mmtCO 2e by
2030, the second largest absolute increase among transportation modes. By 2020 aircraft emissions reach
200 mmtCO 2e and by 2030 reach 244 mmtCO 2e , or 12 percent of transportation total.
GHG emissions from air transportation increase because aircraft travel demand as measured in air seat
miles available is predicted to increase from 995 billion miles in 2009 to 1,465 billion miles in 2030, a growth
of 47 percent. Air travel demand stems from rising real disposable personal income per capita, which
increases from $ 29,157 ( in 2000 dollars) in 2009 to $ 42,741 by 2030, also a growth of 47 percent. Aircraft
fuel economy measured in aircraft seat miles per gallon of jet fuel is projected to increase 15 percent from
63.6 to 73.4, partially offsetting increased aircraft travel demand.
Figure 3- 3: GHG emissions by transport mode, 1970- 2030
Source: DOE 2009; EIA 2008
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
2014
2018
2022
2026
2030
GHG Emissions ( mmtco2e)
He a vy Trucks
Air
Marine
Ra il
Light- Duty
Vehicle s
28 Conti et al.
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Marine and Rail GHG Emissions
The remaining non- highway transportation modes also are forecast to experience growth in GHG emissions.
Marine and rail are the fourth and fi fth largest sources of GHG emissions in the transportation sector,
respectively. In 2009, marine traffi c accounted for fi ve percent of total transportation emissions, while rail
accounted for two percent of total transportation emissions.
Marine emissions are projected to increase from 102 mmtCO 2e in 2009 to 118 mmtCO 2e by 2030, or six
percent of total transportation emissions after a 16 percent growth. Rail emissions are forecast to grow from
46 mmtCO 2e in 2009 to 56 mmtCO 2e in 2030, remaining around three percent of total emissions despite a
22 percent growth. Marine and rail emissions are driven by an increase in ton miles traveled in each mode
while fuel effi ciency in both is projected to remain relatively constant in terms of ton miles per Btu.
Impacts of ACESA
GHG emissions are unregulated in the United States, but continue to garner signifi cant attention because
of concerns about anthropogenic climate change. Since transportation accounts for one- third of total U. S.
GHG emissions by end use, great focus and attention has been devoted to developing policies that could
substantially reduce its emissions. One way to reduce GHG emissions that has drawn the support of many
U. S. lawmakers is through a cap- and- trade program. This system functions by using market- based methods
to reduce GHG emissions by essentially making it more costly to emit GHGs. A cap- and- trade system sets
an overall level of allowable GHG emissions for the entire economy, minus exempted sources. Allowable
emissions are then allocated to various emissions sources that are required to maintain emissions at levels
below the caps.
Compliance is enforced through a requirement for entities subject to the cap to report GHG emission
allowances, which are bankable, suffi cient to cover their emissions. For those unable to do so, allowances
can be purchased from other owners of emissions sources that successfully reduced emissions below the
amount they were allotted. This effectively places a price on GHG emissions and creates a market price
on allowances as an incremental cost to emitting GHGs. A fi nal, but critical, element of a cap- and- trade
system is that the GHG emission caps are reduced over time with the expectation that the market price to
emit a given unit of GHG emissions will increase and encourage efforts to reduce emissions.
On June 26, 2009, the U. S. House of Representatives passed H. R. 2454, the American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009 ( ACESA), a complex bill that uses a cap- and- trade market- based mechanism
to reduce the emission of GHG emissions, along with effi ciency programs and other economic incentives
( ACESA, 2009). The Title III cap- and- trade program for GHG emissions, which covers roughly 84 percent
of total U. S. GHG emissions by 2016, is in many respects the centerpiece of the bill. The program subjects
covered emissions to a cap that declines steadily between 2012 and 2050. The cap requires a 17 percent
reduction in covered emissions by 2020 and an 83 percent reduction by 2050, relative to a 2005 baseline
with targets that decline steadily for intermediate years.
EIA Analysis of ACESA
The EIA analyzed ACESA by considering the energy- related provisions in the proposed legislation that can
be analyzed using the National Energy Modeling System ( EIA 2009b). The starting point for the analysis
was the updated reference case of the Annual Energy Outlook 2009 ( EIA 2009a), which includes the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( ARRA 2009) and other updates capturing recent changes in the
U. S. economy. While this analysis is as comprehensive as possible, it does not address all provisions of
ACESA, such as the authority provided to establish effi ciency standards for transportation equipment other
than LDVs and the effects of increased investment in energy research and development. Thus, results are
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
29 Conti et al.
presented with the important caveat that the lone effect on the transportation sector from ACESA analyzed
by the EIA is the impact of a cap- and- trade system on fuel prices.
Furthermore, the analysis of ACESA separates demand sectors by transportation, industrial, buildings, and
electric power for analysis. This differs from the method used in the fi rst section of this chapter. The analysis
in the fi rst section divided emissions between industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation, with
electricity usage attributed to the various end users. For its analysis of H. R. 2454, GHG emissions from
electric power generation were aggregated and compared to emissions from the transportation, residential
and commercial buildings, and industry sectors.
Allowance prices in the ACESA cases varied from between $ 20 and $ 93 per metric ton of CO 2eq in 2020
to between $ 41 and $ 191 per metric ton of CO 2eq in 2030, depending on the various allowance scenarios
evaluated in the report. The EIA prepared a range of analysis cases for this report. The six main scenarios
focus on two key areas of uncertainty-- namely, the role of offsets and the energy system and economic
impacts of ACESA on the timing, cost, and public acceptance of low carbon and no carbon technologies.
The ACESA basic case projects a price of $ 32 per metric ton in 2020 and $ 65 in 2030.
Analysis Results
Figure 3- 4 summarizes the EIA analysis of GHG emissions in 2020 from all energy sectors under each
of the main scenarios examined. According to the EIA analysis, implementation of ACESA will reduce
carbon dioxide ( CO 2 ) emissions between 338 and 1,243 million metric tons ( mmt) in 2020 depending on the
various allowance cases. Emissions fall from 5,905 mmt in the updated reference case to between 4,662
and 5,567 mmt, a decline of between 6 and 21 percent. Emissions projected for 2030 under each scenario
are summarized in Figure 3- 5. GHG emissions decline from 6,207 mmt in the updated reference case to
between 3,633 and 5,293 mmt in the ACESA scenarios, a drop of between 13 and 41 percent.
Transportation is projected to account for relatively little of the total GHG emission reductions due to ACESA.
In 2020, transportation CO 2 emissions decline only between 18 and 66 mmt across cases, from 1,924 mmt to
Figure 3- 4: Energy related CO 2 emissions by sector in ACESA main cases, 2020 ( mmt CO 2 )
Source: National Energy Modeling System Data
30 Conti et al.
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
between 1,858 and 1,906 mmt, a reduction of only one to three percent. By 2030, transportation emissions
will decrease from 2,037 mmt to between 1,915 and 1,985 mmt, a reduction of just 2.5 to 6 percent.
Since emissions from electric power are not included as transportation emissions in the EIA analysis of H. R.
2454, electricity consumption by electric vehicles or plug- in hybrid electric vehicles, while counted towards
transportation emissions in the fi rst section of this chapter, are now attributed to the electric power sector.
Transportation GHG emissions associated with electricity are predicted to be about 5 mmtCO 2e in 2020 and
8 mmtCO 2e in 2030. This explains the difference in total transportation emissions between the H. R. 2454
analysis updated reference case and the updated reference case of the Annual Energy Outlook 2009.
As a result of the relatively small decline in transportation GHG emissions as a result of ACESA,
transportation’s overall share of energy- related end- use emissions increases from 33 percent in 2020 in
the updated reference case to between 34 and 40 percent in the ACESA scenarios and from 33 percent in
2030 to between 38 and 53 percent.
The EIA projects that the vast majority of GHG emission reductions will take place in other sectors affected
by ACESA. Specifi cally, between 80 and 88 percent of reductions in energy- related emissions by 2030
are expected to occur in electric power generation, refl ecting both a change in the electric generation mix
and reduction in electricity consumption in the residential, commercial, and industrial end use sectors.
Reductions are primarily achieved by reducing the role of conventional coal- fi red generation, which in 2007
provided 50 percent of total U. S. generation, and increasing the use of no carbon or low carbon generation
technologies that either exist today, in the case of renewable resources and nuclear power, or are under
development, for example, carbon capture and sequestration from coal burning.
The relatively small changes in transportation are driven by the modest changes in fuel prices. For example,
gasoline price is expected to increase just $ 0.12 to $ 0.67 above the $ 3.62 per gallon projected in the updated
EIA reference case in 2020 and between $ 0.20 and $ 1.28 above the $ 3.82 per gallon price in 2030.
EIA’s analysis of ACESA also includes a sensitivity case that incorporates President Obama’s plan for
tougher CAFE standards. The new CAFE standards require passenger cars to reach a fl eet average of 39
Figure 3- 5: Energy related CO 2 emissions by sector in ACESA main cases, 2030 ( mmt)
Source: National Energy Modeling System Data
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
31 Conti et al.
mpg and light trucks to reach a fl eet average of 30 mpg in model year 2016. In the sensitivity case, these
new fuel economy standards are slightly exceeded for model year 2016, reaching 39.3 mpg for passenger
cars, 30.4 mpg for light trucks, and a combined 34.8 mpg given the mix of cars and trucks projected for
that year, compared to the 38.0, 27.9, and 32.9 miles per gallon projected in the Annual Energy Outlook
2009 updated reference case, respectively. The difference in achieved fuel economy for light- duty vehicles
narrows subsequently, with fuel economy reaching 36.4 mpg in 2020 in the CAFE sensitivity case compared
to 35.6 mpg in the reference case and 38.7 mpg in 2030 versus 38.1 mpg. The revised standards do not
start until 2012, as fuel economy standards for model year 2011 have already been promulgated by the
National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration. Standards are assumed to remain the same after model
year 2016.
Light- duty vehicle GHG emissions in the CAFE sensitivity case decline from 1036.5 mmtCO 2e in 2016 to
982.5 mmtCO 2e in 2020 and 952.2 mmtCO 2e in 2030, compared to 1055.5 mmtCO 2e , 1011.8 mmtCO 2e , and
1021.3 mmtCO 2e in the updated reference case, respectively. As a percent, the proposed CAFE standards
reduce LDV emissions by 2 percent in 2016, 3 percent in 2020, and 7 percent in 2030 compared to the
reference case. As a total percent of transportation, the new CAFE standards reduce GHG emissions by
1.5 percent in 2016, 2.2 percent in 2020, and 5 percent in 2030.
Conclusions
The EIA has concluded that a cap- and- trade system that effectively places a price on GHG emissions will
produce relatively little reduction in GHG emissions from the transportation sector. This implies that, for
a given price on GHG emissions, the transportation sector is not the most cost effective sector to reduce
emissions. Also, recently proposed CAFE standards offer reductions in transportation GHG emissions.
However, even these reductions are moderate and would require much higher standards to more signifi cantly
reduce emissions relative to the updated reference case.
This implies that the transportation sector does not initially offer many opportunities for emission reduction
that are as cost effective as those available in other sectors, such as changes in the electricity generation
mix. The transportation sector is, however, the largest end- use GHG emitter, and the second largest
demand- based source of emissions if electric power is counted separately. Thus, efforts to signifi cantly
reduce U. S. GHG emissions will eventually need to address transportation sector emissions.
While a price on carbon does not yield signifi cant reductions in transportation emissions, at least four major
proposals have been put forth and advocated as ways to reduce GHG emissions in transportation:
• Increasing vehicle fuel economy standards
• Using low carbon fuel alternatives
• Reducing vehicle miles traveled by mode switching from LDVs into rail and from heavy truck freight
into rail and marine freight
• Changing land use patterns
There are many challenges and uncertainties facing the implementation of any of these proposals, but
they merit careful analysis and consideration, if energy security considerations, equity concerns, or the
need to prepare for deeper GHG emissions reductions in the future are deemed to require greater near-term
reductions in fossil fuel use in the transportation sector than the ACESA market- based cap- and- trade
system is expected to provide.
32 Conti et al.
Chapter 3 Climate and Transportation Solutions
References
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H. R. 2454 ( ACESA). 2009. U. S. Congress.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( ARRA). 2009. U. S. Congress.
Energy Independence and Security Act ( EISA). 2007. Public Law No: 110- 140, U. S. Congress.
Energy Information Administration ( EIA). 2009a. Annual Energy Outlook 2009. Washington, DC.
http:// eia. doe. gov
Energy Information Administration ( EIA). 2009b. Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H. R. 2454, the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Web site
http:// www. eia. doe. gov/ oiaf/ servicerpt/ hr2454/ index. html
Energy Information Administration ( EIA). 2008. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report.. Web site http:// www. eia.
doe. gov/ oiaf/ 1605/ ggrpt/ index. html
Energy Information Administration ( EIA). 2009c. Updated Annual Energy Outlook 2009 Reference Case Service
Report. Web site http:// www. eia. doe. gov/ oiaf/ aeo/ index. html
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis ( BTS). 2009. National Economic Accounts, National
Income and Product Accounts Table, Personal Income and Its Disposition. http:// www. bea. gov/ national/ nipaweb/
TableView. asp? SelectedTable= 58& Freq= Qtr& FirstYear= 2007& LastYear= 2009.
U. S. Department of Energy ( DOE). 2009. Transportation Energy Databook, 28th Edition. Washington, DC.
33
Chapter 4:
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Road Transport
in Latin America
by Lee Schipper, Elizabeth Deakin, and Carolyn McAndrews
Today, Latin America is a small contributor to the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases ( GHG). However,
the region’s car ownership, use and emissions are higher than would be predicted on the basis of population
or gross domestic product ( GDP), and car traffi c clogs the streets and pollutes the air of many Latin American
cities. Furthermore, Latin American carbon emissions from transport, mostly from cars, are predicted to
grow threefold by 2030 as both automobile ownership and vehicle use expand. The total emissions will still
be small compared to those of developed countries, but they will not be trivial.
As a heavily motorized and urbanized part of the developing world, Latin American cities suffer from
notorious congestion and air pollution. Yet, Latin America has also become one of the birthplaces of Bus
Rapid Transit ( BRT), fi rst in Curitiba Brazil, but now in an increasing number of large cities. Reducing
carbon dioxide ( CO 2 ) emissions from urban transport in Latin America as population and incomes in urban
areas grow is a challenging goal, but it is one that many cities are already pursuing. Substantial additional
gains seem achievable. This chapter reviews the challenges these cities face.
Global GHG and CO 2 Trends— Where Is Latin America?
There is broad consensus that GHGs are warming the planet ( IPCC 2007). Many human activities
produce GHG emissions, but roughly two- thirds of the total anthropogenic emissions comes from fossil
fuel combustion for transportation, buildings, and industry. Anthropogenic GHGs, including methane, CO 2
and small quantities of other potent gases, also come from agriculture, mining, natural gas production,
landfi lls, and industrial processes. Land use changes that remove plants that absorb CO 2 contribute to the
problem.
Figure 4- 1 shows the origin of CO 2 emissions from all fossil fuel combustion by region of the world. About
half of the total emissions comes from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD)
countries, excluding Mexico, and about 20 percent are emitted in China, but only seven percent are from
Latin America. On a per capita basis, the world average was 4.3 metric tonnes of CO 2 per capita, while that
from Latin America was only 2.5 tonnes per capita.
____________________
L. Schipper is Project Scientist at the Center for Global Metropolitan Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. E.
Deakin is Professor of City and Regional Planning and Design and C. McAndrews, is a PhD candidate at the University
of California, Berkeley
34 Schipper et al.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
Source: International Energy Agency ( IEA 2008)
Figure 4- 1: CO 2 emissions from all fossil fuel combustion by country or region
in 2006 ( million metric tonnes)
Figure 4- 2 shows global CO 2 emissions among major energy consuming sectors in 2006. Figure 4- 3 shows
the pattern just for Latin America, including Mexico, in the same year. Interestingly, road transport represents
a full one- third of the total CO 2 emissions in Latin America, higher than the world average share.
In explaining differences in CO 2 emissions among regions or countries, the most obvious factors are
population and level of development, as measured by per capita income. A host of additional factors share
in explaining differences, including geography and local climate, degree of urbanization, land uses, fuel mix,
and the effi ciency of energy use ( IEA 1997). Differences in policies, available technologies, and fuel prices
shape the latter factors.
Source: IEA
Figure 4- 2: CO 2 emissions for the entire world by sector,
including electricity losses allocated to end- us sectors, 2006
Other energy
industries*
7%
Manufacturing
industries and
construction
35%
Road
Transport
17%
Other
Transport
7%
Residential.
Commercial,
Agriculture **
34%
In comparison with the world as a whole, the CO 2 emissions in Latin America are more heavily concentrated
in transportation, which produces 35 percent of its total emissions, compared to a 24 percent transport
share throughout the world. Furthermore, transport emissions are concentrated in road transport, which
accounts for over 90 percent of the region’s transport emissions.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
35 Schipper et al.
For the world as a whole, the transport emissions/ GDP ratio has declined by about 20 percent since 1990
( IEA 2008). As shown in Figure 4- 4, however, regional differences are large, with some regions showing
increases in the ratio, while others have achieved substantial decreases. For Latin America, the ratio of
road transport CO 2 emissions to GDP has declined slightly, by less by 0.5 percent per year. In other words,
transport emissions in Latin America have increased at almost the same rate as GDP has grown.
Data from the International Energy Agency ( IEA) indicate that direct emission increases from tailpipes have
been driven in large part by the rising importance of fossil fuels for transport, especially in populous Brazil,
Figure 4- 3: CO 2 emissions for Latin America including electricity
losses allocated to end- use sectors, 2006.
Total 2.5 metric tonnes CO 2 / capita
Other energy
industries*
9%
Manufacturing
industries and
construction
34%
Road Transport
32%
Other Transport
3%
Residential.
Commercial,
Agriculture **
22%
Source: IEA
Figure 4- 4: Ratio of road transport CO 2 emissions to GDP for regions, 1990 and 2007
Source: IEA. Note the data for India are 1996 and 2007 as there are no road- transport
diesel data before 1996.
36 Schipper et al.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
where use of ethanol from sugar cane did not keep pace with the demand for automobile fuels after 1990.
Tailipipe emissions from ethanol produced from sugar cane are signifi cantly lower than those of gasoline.
Emissions from other sectors in Latin America grew less rapidly than those from road transport. Thus the
importance of road transport in the Latin America emissions story has increased over time.
Road Transport in Latin America
An understanding of CO 2 emissions from road transport in the region requires a clear picture of the vehicle
fl eet and vehicle use, usually measured in vehicle- kilometers ( km) of driving. Data on vehicle ownership
and yearly usage have been developed by the International Energy Agency and the World Business Council
for Sustainable Development ( WBCSD 2004) and are used here, with some modifi cations.
Vehicle Ownership
Figure 4- 5 shows light duty vehicle ( LDV) ownership in different regions of the world, relative to both
population and GDP, in 2005. Among the developing regions shown, Latin America had a per capita
ownership of light duty vehicles of 86 vehicles per 1,000 people, mostly private cars, SUVs, and light
trucks.
The high level of motorization in Eastern Europe is explained in large part by a rapid increase in cars bought
used after 1990 and the stronger presence of Western European automobile manufacturing in Eastern
Europe after that time. Even though China and India have much larger populations, the per capita auto
ownership is very low and even the absolute numbers of LDVs in those two giants were still well below the
number in Latin America in 2005.
Figure 4- 5: Light duty vehicle ownership vs. income and population,
2005, selected regions
Source: IEA MoMo Database ( IEA 2009)
Notes: 10 to 20 percent of these light duty vehicles are commercial vans or pickups. GDP per
capita in USD $ 1,000 ( 2000 PPP) shown above each region. 1990 data are from 1996, as
previous years contain diesel used in stationary sectors.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
37 Schipper et al.
Vehicle Use and Emissions in Latin America
Data estimated by the WBCSD’s Sustainable Mobility Project ( WBCSD 2004) and more recently refi ned
by the International Energy Agency ( Fulton et al. 2009) provide information on vehicle types, their energy
intensities, and the average km driven each year for Latin American countries. CO 2 emissions by vehicle
type can be calculated from these data. The total fuel use for each particular fuel and vehicle type is
calculated using the estimated numbers of vehicles, distance/ vehicle, and fuel/ distance, with national road
fuel use as tabulated by the IEA used as the control total. Table 4- 1 presents the results.
For the region as a whole, about half of road transport emissions are for passenger traffi c, the other half
for freight travel. The dominant vehicles are LDVs, most of which are passenger cars. The urban share of
traffi c ( VKT), emissions and the number of passenger kilometers traveled were estimated. The results are
shown in Table 4- 2.
Table 4- 2 shows that about 60 percent of all road transport emissions in Latin America appear to be
associated with urban areas, with LDVs responsible for well over half of the urban emissions. Further
Table 4- 1: Road transport emissions in Latin America in 2000 by vehicle type: The role of light duty vehicles
Vehicle Type Vehicles ( 100,000) Km / year Energy, EJ
Emissions
Mtonnes CO 2
Share of total CO 2
Emissions
LDV Pass. 40,127 13,000 2.11 155.4 41.70%
Motorcycles 6,948 7,500 0.05 3 0.80%
Minibuses 930 40,000 0.21 14.1 3.80%
Buses 511 40,000 0.2 14.5 3.90%
LDV freight 4,459 13,000 0.23 16.2 4.40%
Med Trucks 5,385 22,000 1.15 77.6 20.80%
Heavy Trucks 2,314 50,000 1.38 92.2 24.70%
Total - - 5.33 372.9 -
Note: 1 EJ ( exajoule= 1018 joules) = 24 MTOE ( million tonnes of oil). Data adjusted to include Mexico.
Emissions for rail were included in the original Sustainable Mobility Project spreadsheets but are
omitted here.
Source: WBCSD Sustainable Mobility Project and IEA.
Table 4- 2: Estimated urban share of traffi c and emissions by vehicle type, Latin America 2000
Vehicle Type
Urban Share
of VKT
Urban VKT
( billion)
Vehicle Occupancy
( people)
Passenger km
( billion)
Emissions
MTonnes CO 2
Share of
Urban CO 2
LDV and Motorcycles 80% 453 2 907 127 61.50%
Mini Buses 80% 30 20 595 11 5.50%
Buses 50% 10 50 511 7 3.50%
Light Trucks 80% 46 - - 13 6.30%
Medium Trucks 50% 59 - - 39 18.80%
Heavy Trucks 10% 12 - - 9 4.50%
Total - 510 - 2013 208 100%
38 Schipper et al.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
assuming that LDVs in urban regions have an average occupancy of two people, motorcycles one person,
minibuses 20 people, and large buses 50 people, it appears that two trillion passenger km of driving occurred
in these motorized modes in Latin American urban areas in 2000.
Data from major metropolitan regions of Latin America are consistent with the estimates of urban traffi c and
emissions generated from national and regional data for specifi c cases. Table 4- 3 and Figure 4- 6 show the
results for Mexico City in 2006. The data come from the region’s emissions inventory, which is updated
every other year.
Table 4- 3: CO 2 emissions, vehicles and traffi c, Mexico City, 2006
Vehicle Type Mtonnes CO 2 Vehicles ( 100,000) Billion VKT
Cars 10.49 3,395.80 46.31
Taxis 2.6 155.1 10.38
VW Bus Colectivos 0.7 39.7 2.64
Other Colectivos 0.74 36.1 2.54
Pick Up 0.83 133.4 3.48
Other Vehicles < 3 t 0.63 81.6 1.8
Truck Tractors 1.63 60.9 1.38
Autobuses 1.87 43.1 1.79
Other Vehicles < 3 t 0.54 100.8 2.2
Motorcycles 0.37 180.7 4.47
Totals 20.4 4,227.30 76.98
Source: Mexico City Emissions Inventory ( SMA, 2006)
Figure 4- 6: CO 2 emissions from the main classes of transport emitters in the
Mexico City Metropolitan Area, 2006
Source: Mexico City SMA emissions inventory estimated by vehicle, distance, and fuel
intensity.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
39 Schipper et al.
The results show that individual cars, pickup trucks, taxicabs, and motorcycles account for 68 percent of
the CO 2 emissions from all transportation sources in Mexico City ( SMA 2006). Traffi c is also dominated by
small individual vehicles, which account for almost 83 percent of the VKT. Interestingly, Mexico City car
ownership is lower than that in many other large Mexican cities, so the share of emissions in LDVs may
be even higher in other Mexican urban areas, where there are more cars per capita. This also implies that
the light duty personal vehicle fl eet in other Mexican cities is an even greater contributor to CO 2 emissions
than it is in Mexico City.
Patterns for Santiago de Chile ( Escobar 2007), Bogotá ( Giralto 2005), and Sao Paulo ( Vasconcellos personal
communication 2008; Melor de Alvares personal communication 2008) are similar. LDVs account for less
than 25 percent of travel, but more than 60 percent of VKT and CO 2 emissions in these urban areas.
Present trends in the Latin America region point to increasing automobile ownership and use. Latin America
will probably approach Europe’s level of motorization in the 1960s by 2030, but with far more urban regions
of over fi ve million people than Europe has even now. Between 2004 and 2006, Latin America had four
urban agglomerations with 10 million people or more— Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Rio de
Janeiro. Europe had just one, Paris. Lima, Bogotá, Santiago and Bel Horizonte in Latin America each had
between fi ve and 10 million people, while Europe had just London and Madrid. Latin America had eight
more cities among the world’s 100 largest urban areas ( UN 2007). Traffi c in these largest cities tends to be
the most congested. Thus the prospects for future traffi c problems in the face of growing motorization in all
these large Latin American cities are daunting.
Figure 4- 7 shows forecasts of LDV ownership in 2030 versus per capita GDP for Latin America, China,
OECD nations, the Former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. According to this projection, per capita
income in Latin America will almost double by 2030, with per capita LDV ownership, predominately cars,
Figure 4- 7: Sustainable Mobility Project projections of future LDV ownership
by region
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
$ 0 $ 10 $ 20 $ 30 $ 40 $ 50 $ 60
GDP per Capita, Thousand US Dollars base 2000 using Purchasing Power Cars, Light Trucks, SUVs per 1000 People
All OECD
Eastern Europe
Former Soviet Union
Latin America
Middle East
Other Asia
Africa
India
China
Source: WBCSD 2004
40 Schipper et al.
Chapter 4 Climate and Transportation Solutions
rising to 200 per 1,000 when Mexico is included. This means that, relative to GDP, growth in CO 2 emissions